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ENCRYPTION’S IMPORTANCE TO ECONOMIC
AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
F. LYNN MCNULTY*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The national and societal view of the role of encryption will be
one of the defining issues for our culture in the twenty-first century.
Encryption is cited by Michael Baum, chairman of the Information
Security Committee of the American Bar Association, as “an ena-
bling technology that provides companies, their business partners,
customers and end users with the ability to get the information and
service they need much faster and more securely.”1  Ubiquitous digi-
tal communications will result in either a secure environment to con-
duct personal affairs and electronic commerce or a Kafkaesque world
laid bare by digital fingerprints indicating our every transaction and
thoughts.  The information age has brought to light many important
issues: protection of privacy, infrastructure protection, law enforce-
ment, national security, and economic competitiveness.  In a democ-
racy, it is important to have a public debate on these issues and to en-
sure that our laws adequately address the issue of cryptography to
carry us forward into the twenty-first century.
II.  EQUITIES AND ENCRYPTION GROWTH
The heart of the matter, which is how the nation will protect its
information systems, has been obscured by concerns of equity re-
garding the interests of all involved parties, including business, pri-
vacy advocates, national security agencies, and law enforcement.
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country’s leading provider of commercial cryptography technology.  Prior to joining RSA Data
Security, Mr. McNulty was the Associate Director for Computer Security at the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology.  During his thirty-year federal government career, he held
increasing computer security responsibilities at the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Avia-
tion Administration, and Department of State.  He is also a retired Army Reserve Intelligence
Officer.  Mr. McNulty has a B.A. in International Relations from the University of California,
Berkeley, a M.A. in International Relations from San Jose State University, and a M.S. in Ad-
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1. Laura DiDio, Internet Boosts Cryptography, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 16, 1998, at 32.
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Senator Sam Nunn has spoken about the need for breaking the
deadlock on encryption, which he says is “absolutely essential for in-
frastructure protection as well as for any kind of commercial activi-
ties which are beginning to emerge in the world of the Internet.”2
Nunn added, “I do not think that we can limit the power of encryp-
tion successfully over the long term.  That’s like trying to limit tech-
nology.  I do not think it can be done.”3
On 6 April 1998, International Business Machines (IBM)
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Lou Gerstner, echoed Nunn’s
comments on the importance of unrestricted use of encryption for le-
gitimate purposes.4 Gerstner advocated unrestricted levels of encryp-
tion technology within the United States to secure corporate net-
works from hackers and other unauthorized users.5  Gerstner also
urged the Clinton administration “to work closely with other nations
on a global encryption policy” compatible with domestic U.S. re-
quirements.6
In general, interest in encryption is at an all-time high and de-
mand for it in the commercial marketplace is soaring.  As of April
1998, there were over 300 million copies of RSA7 products in the
commercial marketplace.8  Although most encryption users are law-
abiding, a few are not.  More importantly, a number of companies in
twenty-nine other countries produce 656 encryption products that are
2. US Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FEDERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 1998 (statement of Senator Leahy quoting Senator Nunn), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.  See generally Testimony March 17, 1998 James S. Gorelick
& Sam Nunn Co-Chairs Advisory Committee to the President’s Commission Senate Judiciary
Technology, Terrorism and Government Information Preventing Terrorism, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
3. US Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra
note 2.
4. See Nancy Weil, Gerstner Calls for Unrestricted Encryption, INFOWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 6, 1998 available in LEXIS, News Library, Infwld File.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) are the developers of the first commercialized public
key cryptographic product.  “RSA technologies are part of existing and proposed standards for
the Internet and World Wide Web . . . and business, financial, and electronic commerce net-
works around the globe.”  Security Dynamics Appoints Art Coviello President and Jim Bidzos
Vice Chairman; Signals Further Integration of Security Dynamics and RSA Business Units, PR
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 8, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File.
8. See RSA Data Security, Inc., RSA ‘99: Overview (last modified Nov. 10, 1998) <http://
www.rsa.com/conf99/home.html>.
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as strong as or stronger than encryption products that U.S. companies
sell on the world market.9
In the early 1990s, RSA hosted its first cryptography conference
with approximately sixty people in attendance.10  Beginning in 1996,
the commercial interest in cryptography increased significantly.  By
January 1998, the RSA conference filled the Masonic auditorium on
Nob Hill in San Francisco, with at least 3,000 people in attendance.11
The conference grew to 5,000 people in 1999.12  The majority of at-
tendees are no longer cryptographers, mathematicians, and other
members of academia, but rather are persons from the business and
computer-user communities.13
With respect to electronic payments, secure electronic mail, and
network encryption, numerous standards are developing outside the
public policy debates concerning encryption.14  New developments in-
clude cryptographic applications programming interfaces (CAPIs)
that are bundled with various commercial shrink-wrapped software
products designed to operate with IBM/IBM-compatible and Apple
computers.15  Due in part to large profit realization on the sale of se-
curity products and systems, significant consolidations in the security
product industry are occurring.  For example, in 1996, Security Dy-
9. See Network Associates Products, Total Network Security: Cryptographic Products
(visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.nai.com/products/security/tis_research/crypto/crypt_
surv.asp>.
10. See Jeffrey Kutler, At RSA Confab: An Endless Loop of Intrigue; Conspiracy Theories,
Martin Luther King Jr. Tribute, and Encryption News, AM. BANKER, Jan. 29, 1999, at 12.
11. See RSA Conference Ends with Push to Educate Business, Consumers and Policy Mak-
ers About Need for Data Security, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Prnews File.
12. See Kutler, supra note 10.
13. See RSA Data Security, Inc., RSA ‘99, Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Nov.
10, 1998) <http://www.rsa.com/conf99/faq.html>.
14. See RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s Cryptogra-
phy; Question 1.5, What are Cryptography Standards? (last modified Jan. 26, 1999)
<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/html/1-5.html>.  “Cryptography standards are needed to cre-
ate interoperability in the information security world.  Essentially they are conditions and pro-
tocols set forth to allow uniformity within communication, transactions, and virtually all com-
puter activity.”  Id.  These standards are developed not only by the government, but by private
industry and other organizations.  See id.
15. See RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s Cryptogra-
phy; Question 5.2.1, What are CAPIs? (last modified Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.rsa.com/
rsalabs/faq/html/5-2-1.html>.  “A CAPI, or cryptographic application programming interface, is
an interface to a library of functions software developers can call upon for security and cryptog-
raphy services.  The goal of a CAPI is to make it easy for developers to integrate cryptography
into applications.”  Id.
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namics Technologies, Inc. acquired RSA for over $200 million.16
Trusted Information Systems, a company with a patent on key recov-
ery systems, was acquired for $300 million by Network Associates,
the same company that previously acquired Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP), the vendor of the popular electronic mail encryption pro-
gram.17  We should anticipate more such mergers and acquisitions as
the industry continues this exponential pattern of growth.
The public’s interest in encryption revolves primarily around In-
ternet applications.  For example, people want to protect their credit
card information when engaged in Internet commerce.18  Due to this
public demand, new Internet applications that use encryption as their
basis permit such transactions to occur in a secure manner.19  Cryp-
tography is also used in on-line state lottery systems,20 software
driven slot machines,21 and electronic money applications such as
electronic purse smart cards.22
III.  U.S. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Cryptography provides confidentiality as well as three other ba-
sic functions: authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation.23  Al-
though cryptography can furnish numerous benefits, many of these
16. See Karen Rodriguez, One-Stop Shop Planned-Security Dynamics Acquires RSA for
Improved Security, INTERNETWEEK, Apr. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intwk
File.
17. See Jerry Knight, In the Winner’s Circle: Technology and Takeovers, WASH. POST,
Apr. 6, 1998, at F07.
18. See RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s Cryptogra-
phy; Question 1.7, Why is Cryptography Important? (last modified Jan. 26, 1999)
<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/html/1-7.html>.
19. See id.
20. See Robert Gillette, Computer Experts Grapple with Vulnerable Systems, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1988, at 1.
21. See Silicon Gambling, Inc. Receives Nevada Gaming Commission Approval for Sale of
Slot Machines in Nevada; SGI’s Odyssey, Employing RSA Technology, Brings Next-Generation
Technology to Casino Gaming, BUSINESS WIRE, Apr. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Bwire File.
22. See Jeffrey Kutler, Smart Cards: Even Abundant Security Features Don’t Spur Smart
Card Buy-in, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 1998, at 1; see also Gillette, supra note 20.
23. Task Force on Electronic Commerce, Security/Cryptography, Part I: Cryptography and
its Applications (last modified Mar. 14, 1999) <http://e-com.ic.gc.ca/english/crypto/631d13.
htm>.  “Confidentiality: keeping information protected from unauthorized disclosure or view-
ing by mathematically scrambling the original text.”  Id. “Authentication: proof that users are
who they claim to be or that resources (e.g., computer device, software or data) are what they
purport to be.”  Id.  “Non-repudiation: proof that a transaction occurred, or that a message was
sent or received, thus one of the parties to the exchange cannot deny that the exchange oc-
curred.”  Id.  “Integrity—so that data cannot be modified without detection.”  Id.
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benefits have not been fully utilized in either the private or public
sectors.  For example, the controversy arising from the Social Secu-
rity Administration’s attempt to provide personal earnings and bene-
fits statements on-line24 would not have failed if the government
agency had taken advantage of Web browser-embedded cryptogra-
phy and digital signatures.  Instead, the agency was forced to rescind
its announcement that it was going to make the statements available
to citizens, and the net result was public embarrassment, wasted time,
and a loss of public confidence.25  However, cryptography is only one
integral component of a secure information system.  As Professor
Dorothy Denning of Georgetown University notes, information sys-
tem security depends on many other factors: “access controls, authen-
tication, auditing, configuration management, vulnerability testing
and repair, intrusion and misuse detection, malicious code detection,
and security training and awareness.”26
The recent public debate on cryptography policy has its primary
roots in the Clinton administration’s key escrow-based Clipper chip
proposal of 1993.27  The handling of that proposal effectively poi-
soned the well in terms of any kind of constructive debate on encryp-
tion use.  General distrust of the Clipper chip arose because the cryp-
tographic algorithm on which the chip was based (the Skipjack
algorithm) was developed in secret by the National Security Agency
(NSA).28  The designation of two federal agencies as key escrow re-
24. See Frank Tiboni, SSA Again Tests PEBES for Web Accessibility; Social Security Ad-
ministration’s  Personal Earnings and Benefit Earnings Statements; Government Activity, GOV’T
COMPUTER NEWS, July 27, 1998, at 3.
25. See id.
26. Prepared Statement of Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University, Computer Science
Department Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intel-
lectual Property, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 4, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File.
27. See Rutrell Yasin, Senators Pledge to Push Encryption Reform, INTERNETWEEK, June
22, 1998, available in  LEXIS, News File, Intwk File.  The Clipper chip proposal would have
required every computer to contain an encryption key allowing the government to unlock any
encrypted data.  See Reinhardt Krause, The Encryption Export Debate, INV.’S BUS. DAILY,
May 21, 1998, at A1, available in  LEXIS, News Library, Invdly File.
28. See RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s Cryptogra-
phy; Question 3.6.7, What are Some Other Block Ciphers? (last modified Jan. 26, 1999)
<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/html/3-6-7.html>.  “Skipjack is the encryption algorithm con-
tained in the Clipper chip, designed by the NSA . . . . Initially the details of Skipjack were clas-
sified and the decision not to make the details of the algorithm publicly available was widely
criticized . . . . Aware of such criticism, the government invited a small group of independent
cryptographers to examine the Skipjack algorithm.  They issued a report which stated that al-
though their study was too limited to reach a definitive conclusion, they nevertheless believed
Skipjack was secure.  In June of 1998 Skipjack was declassified by the NSA.”  Id.
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positories engendered further public distrust.29  Federal agency in-
volvement in this manner represented a huge departure from past
practice in the development of federal technical standards.  Standards
development historically had been carried out in public by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and its prede-
cessor, the National Bureau of Standards.30
In the following years, the Clinton administration slowly moved
toward a more reasonable policy by emphasizing the private sector’s
dependence on cryptography and identifying where business and
government interests coincide.31  But, as Secretary of Commerce Wil-
liam Daley recognized in April 1998, the administration still had not
crafted an acceptable encryption policy.32  This continued failure is
largely the result of the government’s relatively unsuccessful at-
tempts to influence the commercial marketplace through the promul-
gation of standards, leveraging government procurements, and export
controls.  With respect to encryption products available in countries
outside the U.S., Daley noted that “most of these producers do not
need an export license if they want to ship encryption software, a
tremendous market advantage.”33  According to Daley, this advan-
tage would result in foreign domination of the market meaning “a
loss of jobs here and products that do not meet either our law en-
forcement of national security needs.”34  More recently however, the
administration’s rhetoric has shifted to the advocacy of a more bal-
anced approach on encryption use.  For example, the government has
run various key recovery35 demonstration projects, thirteen of which
29. See Ellen Messmer, U.S. Government Sets New Course on Security, NETWORK
WORLD, Feb. 28, 1994, at 6.  In February 1994, the Clinton administration announced that the
Department of Treasury and the NIST were to be key escrow repositories for the Clipper chip
split keys.  See id.  “Key escrow is a security technique that places a cryptographic key into the
hands of a trusted third party.”  See Mary Mosquera, Federal Encryption Plan Estimated at $7B,
TECHWEB NEWS, June 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Techwb File.
30. See RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s Cryptogra-
phy; Question 6.2.1, What is NIST? (last modified Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.rsa.com/
rsalabs/faq/html/6-2-1.html>.
31. See William H. Daley, Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley—
“The Emerging Digital Economy”, (Apr. 15, 1998) (transcript available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Feddoc File) [hereinafter Daley Speech].
32. See Bill Pietrucha, Sen. Burns Renews Push To Loosen Encryption Regs, NEWSBYTES,
Apr. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwsbyt File.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. “Key recovery is a general term encompassing the numerous ways of permitting
‘emergency access’ to encrypted data.”  RSA Data Security, Inc., Frequently Asked Question
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were briefed to the public in November 1997.36  Eleven of the thirteen
projects were for the key recovery of stored data.37
Many computer vendors question the feasibility of these key re-
covery schemes.  In June 1998, several chief executive officers of the
leading American computer firms issued a report in which they con-
cluded that government plans to institute a federal key recov-
ery/escrow infrastructure, designed to give law enforcement and in-
telligence agencies access to encrypted materials, would cost as much
as $7.7 billion a year.38  The report, entitled “The Cost of Govern-
ment-Driven Key Escrow Encryption” and issued by the Business
Software Alliance, was endorsed by Microsoft, Novell, Adobe,
Bentley Systems, FileMaker, Lotus Development, Sybase, and Sy-
mantec.39  Novell’s CEO, Eric Schmitt, said, “‘Encryption policy must
be guided by the digital Hippocratic Oath—first, do no harm.’ . . .
The high cost of the key-escrow system does not pass this test.”40
In September 1998, Vice President Al Gore announced a slight
alteration in U.S. export policy.41  The United States eased licensing
requirements on exporting products with varying strengths (including
those products above 56-bits) to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corpora-
tions42 and strategic foreign partners of U.S. companies.43  The gov-
ernment also eased exports to foreign insurance companies in forty-
five countries as well as to foreign health and medical organizations.44
Unfortunately, pharmaceutical firms were not included in this cate-
gory;45 a possible indication that the administration’s intelligence-
gathering priorities are directed against that particular industry.  Li-
cense exceptions were authorized for the export of client-server ap-
plications and applications designed for on-line transactions.46  But
for general exports, the Clinton administration only eased burden-
About Today’s Cryptography; Question 7.12, What is Key Recovery? (last modified Jan. 26,
1999) <http://www. rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/html/7-12.html>.
36. See Questions Trail Federal Key Recovery Pilot Projects’ Progression, HIGH
PERFORMANCE COMPUTING, Nov. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
37. See id.
38. See Mosquera, supra note 29.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Eases  Encryption  Software Export Bans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1998, at C7.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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some licensing and reporting requirements on products operating at
56-bits and under.47  Exports of strong encryption products for use by
the large population of individual users are still subject to arcane ex-
port controls.  The new regulations also favor key recovery products
and other “plain text access” features over those lacking such fea-
tures.48
The administration’s selection of forty-five countries to receive
special attention appears arbitrary because restrictive export controls
on encryption were maintained on certain countries placed in a spe-
cial category known as “Tier 3.”49  This category is one step above the
category including terrorist countries, such as Cuba and North Korea,
against which the United States applies comprehensive economic
sanctions.50  Tier 3 includes Andorra, a significant financial center lo-
cated between France and Spain; Bahrain, a significant financial
services center in the Persian Gulf; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Romania, all NATO applicants; Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates, U.S. allies hosting significant U.S. pe-
troleum interests; Vanuatu, an important South Pacific financial
services center; and Israel, another significant U.S. strategic Middle
East partner.51
47. See Statement by the Press Secretary: Administration Updates Encryption Policy, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1832 (Sept. 16, 1998).
48. See id.  A key recovery product is either “a) [a] stored data product containing a re-
covery feature that, when activated, allows recovery of the plaintext of encrypted data without
the assistance of the end user; or b) [a] product or system designed such that [a] network ad-
ministrator or other authorized persons can provide law enforcement access . . . without the
knowledge . . . of the end user.”  Bureau of Export Administration, Definitions; Related to the
Administrations’s Encryption Policy Guidance Announced September 16, 1998 (last modified
Feb. 23, 1999) <http://207.96.11.93/Encryption/ Definitions.html>.  “Plaintext” refers to the
data initially presented before the encryption takes place.  See id.
49. See Bureau of Export Administration, Export Administration Regulations, Commerce
Control List Overview and the Country Chart (visited Mar. 16, 1999) <http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=bxa&docid=f:738spir. pdf>.
50. See id.
51. See Nancy Weil & Torsten Busse, Thirteen Companies Support Encryption Alternative,
INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, InfoWorld Daily
File.  The other Tier 3 countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China (People’s Republic of),
Comoros, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, Georgia, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Lebanon, Macedonia (The Former Yugoslav Republic of), Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia,
Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen.  See id.
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IV.  THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT CHANGES
In December 1998, a major change took place in the Wassenaar
Arrangement, a group of thirty-three industrialized countries that
banded together after the Cold War to restrict exports of military and
military-civilian “dual use” technology to certain renegade and pa-
riah countries such as Iran and Libya.52  The Wassenaar countries ex-
tended the group’s Dual-Use Control List to encryption hardware
and software cryptography products above 56-bits, which include web
browsers, e-mail applications, electronic commerce servers, and tele-
phone scrambling devices.53  The Wassenaar members also re-
imposed controls on other mass-market products with strengths over
64-bits, such as personal computer operating systems, word process-
ing, and data base programs.54
The revised Wassenaar controls, with their restrictions on the
free trade of cryptographic products, directly challenge the interna-
tional protections against arbitrary interference with individual pri-
vacy and free expression of ideas.  The issuance of the new controls
took place within a week of the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).55  The
timing of these events is ironic because Article 12 of UDHR states,
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home, or correspondence . . . .”56  If cryptography is viewed as
a form of language, restrictions on its use could be construed as rep-
resenting a restriction on free correspondence.  Similarly, privacy ad-
vocates around the world recognize cryptography as a “privacy-
enhancing technology.”57  Therefore, under Article 12 of the UDHR,
restricting its free use can be viewed as an arbitrary interference with
one’s privacy.  Furthermore, on 18 September 1998, Human Rights
Watch spoke out against Wassenaar’s planned new restrictions on
52. See Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies, Welcome to the Wassenaar Arrangement (last modified Feb. 24,
1999) <http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/index1.html>.
53. See Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies, Dual-Use List-Category 5-Part 2-”Information Security” (last
modified Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.wassenaar.org/list/cat5p2.pdf>.
54. See id.
55. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), art. 12.
56. Id. art. 12.
57. Suzanne Andrew, Executive Summary Report, Symposium on Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies (last modified June 15, 1998) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/ SSG/pv01167e.html>.
MCNULTY.DOC 09/09/99  9:40 AM
436 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:427
cryptography58 by warning that communications in coded languages
are protected as a right of free expression under Article 19 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,59 an agreement to
which most members of the Wassenaar Arrangement are parties.60
Notwithstanding these concerns, Clinton administration officials
cited the new Wassenaar controls as a victory in their effort to extend
U.S. levels of export controls on cryptography to the rest of the
world. John P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Ex-
port Controls, cited the U.S. government’s “success in achieving con-
sensus on new multilateral export controls on encryption products
and software” through the Wassenaar Arrangement.61  He said that
this success was a result of the “Attorney General and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense [writing] letters to their foreign counterparts,
and NSA [working] closely with similar agencies in other countries.”62
Barker also said that “[t]he Deputy Secretary of State and senior Na-
tional Security Council officials also made personal contacts in sup-
port of the U.S. approach, and our embassies in Wassenaar capitals
conducted a series of demarches.”63
The American Electronics Association (AEA), an industry
group representing more than 3,000 U.S.-based technology compa-
nies, supports the Clinton administration’s decision to align U.S. ex-
port regulations with the new Wassenaar requirements and to de-
58. See Human Rights Watch, Crypto Controls Threaten Human Rights; Vienna Confer-
ence Warned Against Restricting Free Expression (last modified Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.
hrw.org/hrw/ press98/sept/crypto.htm>.
59. See id.
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.  The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restric-
tions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For
respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national secu-
rity or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
60. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 58.
61. Prepared Statement of John P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Export
Controls Before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on
International Trade and Finance, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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regulate products up to 56-bits, but feels the response is inadequate.64
The group characterized the Wassenaar decision to reimpose controls
on mass market software with key lengths exceeding 64-bits as a
“rollback” because previously there were no limits on key lengths for
mass market software.65  The AEA correctly pointed out that it
“defies simple logic to suggest that mass market software products
with 65 bit keys is now susceptible to control, but mass market soft-
ware with 64 bit keys are not.”66  Law enforcement and intelligence
agencies find it no less difficult to break 64-bits than 65-bits.  The dif-
ference is virtually meaningless for purposes of cryptanalysis and ac-
cordingly the separation is purely arbitrary.  In addition, the AEA
concluded that the Wassenaar agreement to control a common list of
products does not mean that members will adhere to a level playing
field, because Wassenaar members have the discretion either to re-
quire or not require export licenses for certain encrypted mass mar-
ket products.67
A. Export of  Weapons and Wassenaar
Wassenaar’s attempt to control the export of weapons to coun-
tries at war demonstrates the difficulty in enforcing export regimes.
For example, Russia, a Wassenaar member, has violated the Ar-
rangement by delivering $150 million worth of combat aircraft, heli-
copters, and other military equipment to Ethiopia.68  While Was-
senaar does not control the export of small arms, like rifles, it does
seek to deter the export of large armaments to warring or “pariah”
states.  Pyotr Litavrin, the Head of Division for the Russian Depart-
ment for Security and Disarmament Affairs, criticizes Wassenaar for
failing to halt Russian arms exports to Iran.69  Litravin maintains that
many disagreements between the United States and Russia prevent
Wassenaar from becoming “a comprehensive and efficient arms ex-
port control regime.”70  In October 1998, Pier Benedetto Francese,
Italy’s Representative to the United Nations, told the General As-
64. See Administration Encryption Efforts with Wassenaar Arrangement Come up Short,
PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See Concern For Weapons Sales to African Nations, AFRICA NEWS, Dec. 11, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Group File, Afrnws File; see also Raymond Bonner, New Weapons
Sales to Africa Trouble Arms-Control Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, sec. 1, at 14.
69. See Walter C. Uhler, Russia in the World Arms Trade, 266 THE NATION 63 n.4 (1998).
70. Id.
MCNULTY.DOC 09/09/99  9:40 AM
438 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:427
sembly that in 1999, the Wassenaar Arrangement would be revised to
close loopholes and include the establishment of an international
agenda on small arms and light weapons.71  Bulgaria, another Was-
senaar signatory, has also violated the weapons restrictions by selling
tanks to Ethiopia and Uganda72 and smaller weapons to rebel move-
ments in Sri Lanka, Congo, and Rwanda.73  In addition, at least two
other Wassenaar participants, Slovakia,74 and Ukraine,75 routinely
violate Wassenaar arms export restrictions.
Many arms control specialists believe that Wassenaar has not
been effective at limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons.
Lora Lumpe, an arms trade specialist with the Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, has said that the value of the Wassenaar Arrangement
is difficult to see.76  There is no reason to believe that certain coun-
tries will comply with Wassenaar’s cryptography export controls.
Moreover, the United States selectively enforces Wassenaar in pur-
suit of its own clandestine interests around the world.  For example,
the Clinton administration has turned a blind eye to Bulgarian arms
shipments to Africa.77  In addition, the United States has reportedly
violated Wassenaar prohibitions against sensitive technology trans-
fers to China, prompting both a Justice Department probe and a con-
gressional inquiry.78  The allegedly illegal technology transfer in-
cluded cryptographic printed circuit boards that permit ground
control operators to send secure commands to orbiting telecommuni-
cations satellites.79  In a written assessment, the NSA stated, “If the
71. See Response to Crises, Peacekeeping Among Subjects Addressed as General Assembly
Concludes Discussion, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, M2pw
File.
72. See Bonner, supra note 68.
73. See Raymond Bonner, Bulgaria Becomes a Weapons Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1998, at A3.
74. See Nicholas Watt & Richard Norton-Taylor, Blair Challenged on Arms Supplies for
African Rebels, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Feb. 11, 1999, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Guardn File.
75. See Taras Kuzio, Ukraine’s Arms Sales Continue To Expand, 9 JANE’S INTELLIGENCE
REV. 108 n.3 (1998); Museveni Probes Tank Purchase, AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 2, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Afrnws File; Export Official Denies Arms Supplied to Taleban, UNIAN
(Kiev, Ukraine), Aug. 11, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
76. See Bonner, supra note 68.
77. See id.
78. See Simon Beckin, The Furor Over Collaboration With  China  Is Shaping Up To Be
The Single Biggest Threat To The Democrats In This Congressional Election Year, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 24, 1998, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library, Schina File.
79. Michael Kelly, A Chance to Jolt China With Straight Talk, 30 NATIONAL J. 1488 n.26
(1998).
MCNULTY.DOC 09/09/99  9:40 AM
1999]  ENCRYPTION’S IMPORTANCE 439
encryption board was reverse-engineered, the knowledge gained
could be used to strengthen adversaries’ knowledge of the systems
the United States uses to safeguard its satellite communications sys-
tem.”80
In addition to arms control specialists, many other vendors and
industry associations around the world decried the Wassenaar con-
trols, arguing against cryptography controls in much the same fashion
that U.S. companies voiced their opposition to the Clipper chip some
five years earlier.  For example, Electronic Frontiers Australia
spokesperson Greg Taylor declared,
Cryptography controls have been universally condemned by pri-
vacy advocates, industry groups, and professional bodies for many
years.  At a time when there was an expectation that common sense
might finally prevail, the world’s cold warriors have met in closed
session in Vienna to rebuff their many critics and to extend existing
controls to commonly available commercial products.81
Wassenaar has had at least one important consequence: the de-
bate on cryptography policy has became an international one.
B. Burgeoning International Debate
In an interview with the Finnish national newspaper Helsingin
Sanomat, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen alluded that it was
the very powerful position of the United States that forced through
the changes to Wassenaar.82  He added that “the Wassenaar negotia-
tions are highly secret.”83  The Prime Minister, noting that the con-
trols could hurt Finnish industry, stated that “Finland still aims for
openness and free markets also in this area.”84  Lipponen had to con-
sider the position of Nokia, a Finnish firm with a large market share
of the international cellular telephone market.  Nokia’s trade policy
director told Helsingin Sanomat that his firm believed, along with
other industry sectors, that strong encryption should be permitted
and its export should not be restricted.85  The Nokia executive said
that applying for export restrictions creates additional work and costs
and the process is a “difficult thing.”86  Finland had previously an-
80. Id. at 1488.
81. Electronic Frontiers Australia Inc. Media Release, New Encryption Controls Con-
demned (last modified Dec. 13, 1998) <http://www.efa.org.au/Publish/ PR981214.html>.
82. See Finnish Prime Minister On Wassenaar, HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Dec. 15, 1998, at B7.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
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nounced a policy that ensured the freedom to use cryptography
products and a liberalized approach to the trade of products using
cryptography.87
Like Finland, Denmark has decided not to overly restrict cryp-
tography use.  Announcement of its signature to the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement caused a political backlash, with some Parliament mem-
bers complaining that the Danish government had violated its earlier
commitment not to restrict the technology.88  Kim Behnke, the par-
liamentary leader of the pro-free trade Progress Party89 demanded an
explanation from the Danish Science Minister as to why Denmark
acceded to the new Wassenaar controls.90
In Germany, Bundnis 90/Die Grünen (the Green Party), a key
player in the governing coalition, also criticized the German govern-
ment for caving in to U.S. pressure for stronger controls on cryptog-
raphy above 64-bits.91  In early 1998, the parliamentary faction of the
Green Party specifically asked the German government if it was
aware that agencies such as the NSA were “watering down” encryp-
tion standards and systems.92  The government’s response was sur-
prisingly candid: the restrictive U.S. export policies on encryption
were well known and the German cryptographic agency, the Bunde-
samt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal German In-
formation Security Agency) (BSI), was generally hesitant to recom-
mend U.S. encryption products for use by German government
agencies and corporations.93  BSI’s reluctance may be explained by
the fear that exported U.S. cryptographic products have been weak-
ened or contain some type of back door access mechanism.  Such
concerns adversely affect foreign customer confidence in the security
afforded by such products.
87. See Government of Finland, National Cryptography Policy (last modified Jan. 28,
1998) <http://www.vn.fi/lm/telecom/cryptography/guidelines.htm>.
88. See Bo Elkjaer, Wassenaar Explosion in Denmark (last modified Dec. 16, 1998)
<http://jya.com/wass-dk.htm>.
89. The Progress Party is opposed to trade sanctions and other impediments. Its platform
states that the best way to promote human rights in all countries and combat totalitarian re-
gimes is through free trade and the exchange of information. See The Progress Party
(Fremskridtspartiet, Fp) (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.frp.dk/foreign/engelsk.htm>.
90. See Elkjaer, supra note 88.
91. See Bert-Jaap Koops Homepage-Crypto Law Survey, Overview Per Country, Version
14.3, February 1999, Germany (last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/
koops/ cls2.htm#ge>.
92. See Gleiss Lutz Hootz Hirsch, Federal Government Remarks Concerning Encryption,
MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Apr. 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mondaq File.
93. See id.
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Some U.S. political leaders have also criticized the amended
Wassenaar regulations.  One such leader is Republican Senator Con-
rad Burns, chairman of the Senate Commerce Communications Sub-
committee and a champion of Senate Bill 377 (Promotion of Com-
merce On-Line in the Digital Era [Pro-CODE]), a bill that would
loosen export controls on encryption and prohibit the federal gov-
ernment from restricting the domestic use of cryptography.94  Burns
criticized the Wassenaar restrictions by saying, “It is still baffling to
people like me who view the Internet as an information revolution
that should be allowed to grow and flourish that the Clinton-Gore
Administration would work consistently to thwart the security back-
bone of electronic commerce and computer privacy.”95  Burns also
declared that the administration “continues to live in this mythical
world in which turning back the tide on technology and privacy is the
policy tool of choice.  If they think that getting a few countries to
agree to their restrictions is going to get the job done in the Digital
Age, they’re farther down the primrose path than I thought.”96  Burns
alleged further that the Clinton administration treats any law-abiding
citizen who wants to participate in Internet activities as an “enemy of
the state.”97
The Clinton administration’s impetus to control encryption
around the world received a severe blow in January 1999 when
France, a country having even stronger cryptographic controls than
the United States (it restricted the domestic use of encryption), an-
nounced it was dropping all controls on cryptography up to 128-bits
in strength.98  On 19 January 1999 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin is-
sued the following announcement:
To change the orientation of our legislation, the government has
adopted the following orientations, which I discussed with the
President of the Republic:
- to offer total freedom in the use of cryptography;
94. See Robert MacMillan, Burns, McCain To Tackle Encryption, Telecom, NEWSBYTES,
Dec. 11, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwsbyt File.
95. International Export Group Wants New Encryption Ban, COMM DAILY, Dec. 4, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Comdly.
96. Id.
97. MacMillan, supra note 94.
98. See Conférence de presse de Monsieur Lionel JOSPIN, Premier ministre, à l’issue du
Comité interministériel pour la société de l’information Hôtel de Matignon [Press Conference of
Mr. Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister, on the issue of the Interministerial Committee on the Infor-
mation Society, Hotel Matignon], Jan. 19, 1999 (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.
premierministre.gouv.fr/ PM/D190199.HTM>.
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- to remove the obligatory character of requiring the deposit of en-
cryption keys with third parties;
- to supplement the current legal authority with the introduction of
obligations, together with penal sanctions, concerning the handing-
over to judicial authorities, when required, of plain text transcrip-
tions of encrypted documents.  Additionally, the technical capaci-
ties of the public authorities will significantly be reinforced . . . .
Changing the law will take several months.  The government
wanted the principal obstacles that deter citizens from protecting
the confidentiality of their communications and stymie develop-
ment of the electronic commerce mitigated.  While waiting for the
announced legislative modifications, the government has decided to
raise the threshold of unrestricted cryptography from 40-bits to
128-bits . . . .99
France’s new policy abolished its complex licensing scheme for
cryptographic imports and domestic use, mandatory key registration
requirements for the domestic use of encryption, and a system of
government-approved trusted third parties.100
Prime Minister Jospin likened France’s draconian encryption
policies to the Second World War’s Maginot Line, a military barri-
cade along the French border with Germany that later proved com-
pletely ineffective.  Criticizing the 1996 French law on cryptography,
Jospin said that “[it] is no longer viable.  It strongly holds back the
usage of cryptography in France, and does not have any impact on
allowing the authorities to effectively fight the criminal use of en-
cryption.”101  Rather than impose key registration or escrow regula-
tions, the government said it would sponsor legislation for criminal
sanctions against suspects who refuse to decrypt data pursuant to a
lawful court order.102
V.  THE CANADIAN APPROACH
It is worthwhile to contrast the American approach on encryp-
tion to that of Canada.  Early in 1998, the Canadians put forward a
draft cryptography policy as part of its Electronic Commerce Strat-
egy.103  The document spelled out the government’s approach to cryp-
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Kenneth Neil Cukier, France Heralds Fall of its Crypto ‘Maginot Line’, COMM. WK.
INT’L, Feb. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
102. See id.
103. See Government of Canada, Minister Manley Outlines Canadian Cryptography Policy
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://info.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/261ce500dfcd72598525648200
68dc6d/85256613004a2e1785256690004c70fb?OpenDocument>.
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tography use and invited the public to offer their own thoughts and
proposals.104  The Canadians framed their discussion around whether
key recovery for stored data should be market driven, revolve around
minimum government standards, or be subject to mandatory stan-
dards.105  The other major component, real time communications (i.e.,
active, live communications), was also discussed.106  The debate cen-
tered around whether the status quo should be maintained (i.e., no
key recovery), statutory requirements on telecommunications pro-
viders should be implemented, or a public key infrastructure, in
which key recovery would be an integral part of the national infra-
structure of Canada, should be adopted.107  Finally, the report asked
for public comment on export controls.  Three options were sug-
gested: relaxation, status quo maintenance, or extension.108  The Ca-
nadian approach represents a novel and refreshing method for start-
ing a public dialogue on cryptography and one that should have been
tried in the United States.  The U.S. government missed an important
opportunity to have a realistic public discussion on cryptography af-
ter the National Research Council released its 1996 report on cryp-
tography policy, Cryptography’s Role in Securing the Information
Society (CRISIS Report).109  At that time, the CRISIS Report accu-
rately reflected the state of United States policy.
VI.  THE LOSS OF MARKET SHARE
Commerce Secretary Daley’s April 1998 speech highlighted the
disagreements within the Clinton administration over strategy and
tactics having to do with export controls on cryptographic products.110
Daley’s speech came at a time when the Economic Strategies Insti-
104. See Industry Canada, Strategis, Cryptography Policy Discussion Paper: Analysis of
Submissions, Introduction (last modified Sept. 28, 1998) <http:// strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/
cy01157e.html>.
105. See Industry Canada, Strategis, Cryptography Policy Discussion Paper: Analysis of
Submissions, Analysis of Responses Part 2: Review of Narrative Responses (last modified Sept.
28, 1998) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/cy01160e. html>.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Industry Canada, Strategis, Cryptography Policy Discussion Paper: Analysis of
Submissions, Analysis of Responses Part 1: Summary of Quantitative Results, Overall Position
Towards Controls on Cryptography (last modified Sept. 28, 1998) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
SSG/cy01159e. html>.
109. See COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996).
110. See Daley Speech,  supra note 31.
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tute (ESI) issued a report that, for the first time, came to grips with
the economic loss suffered as a result of export controls.111  The re-
port stated that the U.S. economy could lose $97 billion over the next
five years as a result of continued export controls on cryptographic
products.112  Furthermore, the ESI report also estimated “that Ameri-
can companies could lose an additional $140 billion in overseas sales,
because foreign buyers will fear that their e-mails and phone calls
could be compromised by U.S. intelligence services.”113
This security fear has already manifested itself in India, for ex-
ample.  In January 1999, the Indian Defense Research and Develop-
ment Organization (DRDO) issued a “red alert” letter to concerned
parties in India expressing its concern about U.S. encryption software
products that can be “broken” by the NSA.114  The DRDO pointed
out that “no encryption software products can be exported from the
U.S. if they are too strong to be broken by the NSA.”115  The DRDO
letter concluded by stating that the quality of such American soft-
ware exported to India is questionable from a security point of view:
“[t]o put it bluntly, only insecure software can be exported.  When
various multinational companies go around peddling ‘secure commu-
nication software’ products to gullible Indian customers, they con-
veniently neglect to mention this aspect of the U.S. export law.”116  In
1998, India announced the development of a sophisticated encryption
program called Trinetra (ThirdEye), advertised as being as strong as
the technology used by U.S. and NATO military forces.117  If India of-
fers this system, or a scaled-down version of it, to the international
commercial marketplace, U.S. business will suffer even further.
To prevent adverse consequences to U.S. businesses, it is essen-
tial to begin a dialogue and study the adverse impact of U.S. export
controls on cryptography.  One German manufacturer of crypto-
graphic products, Brokat Infosystems of Stuttgart, is ecstatic about
111. See Erik R. Olbeter, Encryption  and Security, J. OF COM., Aug. 6, 1998, at 7A.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Mayur Shetty, Red Alert Issued Against U.S. Network Software, ECONOMIC TIMES
(India), Jan. 12, 1999 (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://www.economictimes.com/120199/
lead2.htm>.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Rahul Bedi, India Develops Latest Secure Data System, JANE’S DEF. WKLY. (Oct.
28, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, Jandef File.
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current U.S. export controls.118  The company is setting up virtual
shopping malls all over Europe that use the 128-bits encryption cur-
rently restricted by U.S. export controls.  It claims to have an encryp-
tion product market share of forty percent in Europe and ten to fif-
teen percent worldwide.119 In addition, Brokat has plans to establish
subsidiaries in Belgium and Singapore and is aggressively moving
into the U.S. domestic market.120
Other countries are benefiting from the Clinton administration’s
insistence on strong cryptographic export controls.  For example,
from January to October 1999, the Irish Department of Trade re-
ported that the government granted ninety-nine export licenses to
Irish companies to export cryptographic products.121  Recipients in-
cluded China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Qatar, and South Ko-
rea.122
In addition, Ireland has nurtured an off-shore cryptographic in-
dustry that is blossoming due to the continuation of U.S. export con-
trols.123  On 24 June 1998, the Irish government weighed in with a new
cryptographic policy aimed at supporting domestic cryptographic
vendors like Baltimore Technologies and its competitors, such as Sys-
temics Ltd. of Dublin.124  The Irish government cryptography policy
rejects key escrow and recovery regimes in favor of court-ordered
and warrant-based access to the plain text of encrypted data.  Ire-
land’s policy on the use of encryption technologies recognizes that an
effective policy should achieve a balance between the rights of the
individual in regard to privacy, the need to provide for security and
integrity of communications, support for the cryptography industry in
Ireland, and the requirements for lawful national security and law en-
forcement access to data. 125
118. See BROKAT Enters the American Market, ELECTRONIC COM. BRIEFING, Nov. 1,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment, Export Licensing (last
modified Mar. 10, 1999) <www.irlgov.ie/entemp/export>.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Department of Public Enterprise, Framework for Ireland's Policy on Cryptography
and Electronic Signatures (last modified Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.irlgov.ie/tec/
communications/signat. htm>.
125. See id. The policy comprises the following basic principles:
 Users shall have the right to access strong and secure encryption to ensure the con-
fidentiality, security and reliability of stored data and electronic communications.
 Users shall have the right to choose any cryptographic method.
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U.S. export controls directly led to the creation of communica-
tions security industries in both Finland and Estonia.  Finland’s Da-
tafellows, a world-class cryptographic services company, was started
in 1988; since that time it has doubled its net revenue.126  Datafellows
has strategic partnerships with Finland’s Nokia; Sonera, the former
Finnish Telecom; and Siemens-Nixdorf, the German information
technology giant.127 It is doubtful that Datafellows would have
achieved such success without the imposition of export controls on
American firms.
In 1993, Estonia’s Forex bank launched an on-line banking serv-
ice and was the first bank in Eastern Europe to offer home banking.128
Soon, its major competitor, Hansabank, offered a similar service.129
But Hansabank had one problem: U.S. export laws limited the en-
cryption used by the banks to 40-bits, a situation they found totally
unacceptable.130  Both Forexbank and Hansabank began with external
and foreign security consultants but quickly developed core skills, in-
cluding in-house security.131  The decision to cultivate an in-house
technical base has paid off well.  Now, Forexbank is considering spin-
ning off its technology department to market its skills to rival banks
in Estonia and neighboring countries.132
As with the two major Estonian banks, Latvian bank Trasta
Komercbanka decided not to wait for amendments to U.S. export
control laws before it could obtain strong encryption for its on-line
 The production, import and use of encryption technologies in Ireland shall not be
subject to any regulatory controls other than obligations relating to lawful access.
 The export of cryptographic products is to continue to be regulated in accordance
with the relevant EU Regulations and Decisions and Irish national legislation
which reflect the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies and Conventional Arms.
 In order to enable lawful access to encrypted data, legislation will be enacted to
oblige users of encryption products to release, in response to a lawful authorization,
either plain text which verifiably relates to the encrypted data in question or the
keys or algorithms necessary to retrieve the plain text.  Appropriate sanctions will
be put in place in respect of failure to comply.
126. See Datafellows, Integrated Solutions For Enterprise Security (last modified Mar. 9,
1999) <http://www.datafellows.fi/df-info>.
127. See id.
128. See Starting From Scratch, DIRECT DELIVERY INT’L, Sept. 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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banking.133  The Latvian bank obtained its encryption authentication
cards from Lintel Security SA of Belgium, which uses DES-based
AuthentiCards that are calculator-like devices used to secure cus-
tomer-bank communications.  AuthentiCards generate passwords,
authentication codes and electronic signatures.134
In light of these developments, American businesses have estab-
lished Americans for Computer Privacy (ACP), which has as its ob-
jective the Congressional passage of the Security and Freedom
Through Encryption Act (SAFE).135  The Act will loosen current ex-
port controls as well as forestall any attempt to impose domestic con-
trols on encryption.136  SAFE has significant private sector backing
from groups as diverse as the National Association of Manufacturers,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Association of Floral Tele-
graph Delivery.137  For the first time in American history, cryptogra-
phy is becoming a full-blown political issue.  During 1998, the ACP
even took out political campaign-style television advertisements in
major media markets to decry administration efforts to curb encryp-
tion.138
Some American firms are not waiting for congressional action to
provide relief from export restrictions.  Two recent public an-
nouncements from RSA and Network Associates represent the be-
ginning of a trend by American companies to form foreign relation-
ships that will allow them to compete better in the global encryption
marketplace.  In January 1999, RSA announced the establishment of
its first overseas development center, RSA Data Security Australia
Pty. Ltd., in Brisbane.139  Network Associates, the American vendor
for the PGP encryption program, has set up an international opera-
tions headquarters in the Netherlands and has made an arrangement
with CNLabs of Switzerland to license PGP to foreign users.140
133. See Trasta Komercbanka, Internet Banking (visited Mar. 10, 1999) <http://
www.tkb.lv>.
134. See id.
135. Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1997, H.R. 695, 105th
Cong. (1997).
136. See id.
137. See Erik Espe, Tech Firms Join Forces to Fight Encryption Ban, 16 BUS. J. 1, 14 (1998).
138. See id.
139. See Amy Rogers, RSA Australia Looks to Secure Sales, COMP. RESELLER NEWS, Feb.
1, 1999, at 67.
140. Encryption Exporters Win One, Lose One; Commerce Department Loosens Some Regs,
Court Upholds Others, ELEC. COM. NEWS, July 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
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In addition, two international groups with responsibility for
technical management and standards development for the Internet,
the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), and the Internet Engineering
Steering Group (IESG), have warned that the Internet will be “weak
and vulnerable because of the restrictions recently implemented by
the U.S. government on the export of encryption software.”141  The
IAB and IESG stated that restrictions on encryption threaten both
privacy and protection from criminal assaults on electronic com-
merce.142  The groups, supported by the Internet Society,143 also said
that encryption controls will have a “negative impact” on developing
countries because “many countries are new to the network and may
lack the financial and technical strengths to develop their own cryp-
tographic capabilities.”144
The announcement of the revised Wassenaar regulations, cou-
pled with the September 1998 Clinton administration decision to re-
lax cryptography controls to certain sectors in forty-five countries
and the December 1998 revision of Bureau of Export Administration
controls, indicate one important development in the U.S. plan: to re-
strict the use of cryptography.145  Rather than relying on technical
solutions such as key escrow and key recovery schemes, the admini-
stration and its international allies fell back on traditional methods of
control: export controls, limitations on key lengths, government li-
censing, and mutual legal assistance treaties.146  This choice repre-
sented a major change, albeit regressive, in the administration’s
thinking.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The arguments of those who support the freedom to engage in
secure communications and data processing are well-founded.  Con-
sequently, it is time to have a serious discussion on public policy to-
141. Encryption Restrictions Make Internet Weak, Says IAB/IESG Joint Statement,
TELECOMWORLDWIRE, Dec. 25, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, M2tww File.
142. See id.
143. The Internet Society is a non-governmental international organization that promotes
the global development of the Internet.  See Internet Society, All About the Internet Society
(last modified Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.isoc.org/isoc/mission>.
144. Encryption Exporters Win One, Lose One; Commerce Department Loosens Some Regs,
Court Upholds Others, supra note 141.
145. U.S. Dep’t Com., Bureau of Export Administration, Commerce Updates Export Con-
trols on Encryption Products (last modified Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/
press/98/1230encryption. html>.
146. See id.
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ward encryption and the inherent balance issues that arise with such a
discussion.  Cryptography is necessary to protect both our critical in-
frastructures and our national economic well-being.
With the advent of the computer revolution and recent innova-
tions in the science of encryption, a new market for cryptographic
products has developed.  The United States should nurture rather
than impede this market as secure electronic communications net-
works have become an integral component of the global economy.
Because computers store and exchange an ever-increasing amount of
corporate-sensitive and highly personal information, including medi-
cal and financial data, it is necessary to secure such information from
unauthorized eavesdropping and malicious alteration.  Communica-
tions applications, such as electronic mail, electronic fund transfers,
and on-line purchasing, require secure means of encryption and
authentication.  Such features can only be provided if cryptographic
know-how is widely available and unencumbered by government
regulation and outdated export controls.
